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Three years into his term, hardly anyone would call  the French president successful,  I
guess.  Back  in  2017,  however,  Emmanuel  Macron’s  election  was  met  with  great
expectations, bordering on enthusiasm, by many commentators. It was perceived as a token
of hope, because it was said to prove that it was possible to defeat populism. I found this
rather puzzling. As many others, I was relieved that Marine Le Pen was unable to rally more
than a  third  of  the electorate  behind her  chauvinist  programme,  but  was it  really  an
achievement to beat her? Could not virtually anyone have done?  Moreover, what was it
supposed to mean, that Macron defeated populism?
Of course,  Le Pen exemplifies what is  commonly known as “populist  rhetoric”.  Typical
elements easily recognized are: The promise to change the game of ordinary party politics;
staging as the leader of a movement, and as the voice of the common sense of ordinary
people;  exploiting  prejudice;  and  not  least,  standing  up  against  what  is  described  as
imminent dangers to the national interest and wellbeing of the people.[1] Now, the obvious
differences between their programmes should not make us blind for the striking similarities
between the contestants. Macron, as well, promised a new beginning; staged himself as
leader of a movement, and as the voice of common sense; he too exploited prejudice and
purported to stand up against an imminent danger to the interests and well-being of the
nation. The difference, of course, is that the “common sense” that he appealed to, was the
general worldview of the educated, urban middle classes, whose most deep-rooted prejudice
is the belief that they themselves are unprejudiced. Of course, the imminent danger to the
nation, as perceived by the followers of Macron, was not immigrants or Muslims, but the
populists – and notably, not only on the right wing.
Populism as a polemical concept1.
The term “populism” is most often used polemically,  and notably as a pejorative term,
denoting an actual or potential threat to democracy. Projecting all problems and challenges
to democracy into the image of the populist danger, is a key feature of “centrism” as a
mirror  image of  populism.  On the  other  hand,  blaming the  liberal  mainstream for  all
problems and frustrations is a key feature of “populism” as a mirror image of centrism. In
this way, politics seems like a house of mirrors – where, as we know, it may be difficult to
tell left from right.[2]
Preliminary, we may distinguish between “populist rhetoric” and “the rhetoric of populism”:
On the level of “populist rhetoric”, we have the polemical use of (positive) references to “the
people” – as in speaking for the people, in the name of common sense, defending the people,
mobilizing the people, and so on. What I call “the rhetoric of populism”, work on a different
level, where we encounter the polemical use of (negative) references to “populism” – as in
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attacking  “populists”  and  “populist  rhetoric”  in  the  name  of  reason.  “Populism”  is
sometimes regarded as a symptom, sometimes as the illness itself – but in any case as a
problem. This is why the widespread and recurring “rhetoric of populism” is so problematic,
in my view.
My concern here is not with strategic communication, so I restrict myself to few words on
why I  would not  recommend the “rhetoric  of  populism” as an important ingredient  in
political communication. Most obviously, it is merely reactive – the opponent will keep the
initiative; it is negative – your own virtues stand out only in contrast the vices of your
opponent; it  stays on the surface –substantial debate over programmes are avoided.(Of
course, this gamble may work, sometimes: Macron’s greatest asset in the second round of
the 2017 elections was the fact that he was not Le Pen.) Last, not least, the rhetoric of
populism has an unmistakable tinge of paternalism, of talking down to people. At the end of
the day, this will only strengthen the appeal of straightforward populist rhetoric. Bluntly
put, you will not enlighten anyone by calling him or her stupid. If someone, in your honest
opinion, is prejudiced, misguided or in illusion, you should rather appeal to their capacity
for  thinking,  and provide  them with  reasons  and occasion  for  revising  their  opinions.
However, the problem with the rhetoric of populism is more profound than the – very real –
possibility of alienating voters by offending their intelligence.
There are, of course, good reason to be sceptical towards anyone proclaiming to be the
“voice of  the people” –  but  the rhetoric  of  populism tend to delegitimize any positive
reference to “the people”. If speaking of “the people”, or even worse, for “the people”,
becomes suspect in itself, it affects any attempt to give voice to popular concerns: The
rhetoric  of  populism  tend  to  discredit  any  defence  of  “the  people”  and  any  political
mobilization in the name of “the people”. This is a profound problem, I think, for (at least)
two, interrelated reasons: Firstly, important conceptual resources for the understanding of
social and political dynamics are lost.  Secondly, and even more severe, the concept of
democracy itself becomes obscure. After all, the literal meaning of “democracy” is “rule of
the people”. The term “populism” derive from “populus”, which is but the Latin word for
“demos”.
2. Towards an analytic concept of populism
To address the first of these problems, I will give a very brief sketch of the concept of
“populism” in recent theories of “radical democracy”. My main reference is the book On
Populist Reason, published in 2005 by Argentinian-born political theorist Ernesto Laclau.[3]
As I read it, the author attempt to establish “populism” as an analytical concept, intended to
clarify the dynamics of social, cultural and political conflict. A basic assumption is that these
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aspects are always interrelated, or, in Laclau’s own usage, ‘articulated’ on each other. What
we get, is a framework for interpreting movements that challenge domination. If applied in
a value-neutral, descriptive manner, this works somewhat like a Weberian “ideal type”. In
addition, and in accordance with his own political commitments, the author attempt to do
something more. Laclau is not presenting a political programme, but an enquiry into the
conditions of possibility for left-wing populism. (On Populist Reason is thus a sequel to
Laclau and Mouffe’s earlier work on Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.[4]) For the present
purposes,  I  restrict  myself  to  paraphrasing  the  image  of  the  dynamics  of  political
mobilization offered, and notably in a different vocabulary. Here, the point of interest is not
Laclau’s theoretical approach as such, but the socio-political phenomena that it highlights;
my argument is inspired by, but does not rest on Laclau’s writings.
From time to time, everyone experience suffering, injustice, dissatisfaction – and most of the
time, we endure; blame ourselves, bad luck, the way things are; or we cling to the belief that
things will work out, eventually. Every now and then, patience reach its limit, however. We
complain; demand something done, that something change. If this happen, life goes on. If
not, our grievances may turn into frustrations of a second order; we blame those obstructing
our attempts at relieving our situation. Our disappointment (or anger) may fuel demands for
greater changes; we may question the competence or good will of the people in charge, or
even institutions and power structures. We want to hold something or someone responsible
– and most of the time, we leave it there, maybe clenching our fist in the pocket.
Sometimes,  however,  we  become  aware  that  we  are  not  alone;  others  share  our
experiences, and we voice our claims together. As I understand Laclau, this is a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for a social movement to begin. The crucial point is when a
group constituted by a common demand becomes aware of groups with similar, but not
identical, experiences and claims. Somehow, we come to perceive our claims as being of the
same kind, directed at the same kind of adversaries. Different claims are linked, in what
Laclau terms a “chain of equivalence”. Taken together, these may challenge the legitimacy
of  the socio-political  order,  by questioning “hegemony”,  that  is,  the collective imagery
(“culture” or “ideology”) that provide legitimacy to the prevailing order.
Some of the motivation for the notion of “populist reason” is that such challenges to the
power structures are typically expressed in terms of a conflict between “the people” and
“those in power”. In Laclau’s words:
“A plurality of demands which, through their equivalential articulation, constitute a broader
social subjectivity we will call popular demands – they start, at a very incipient level, to
constitute  the  ‘people’  as  a  potential  historical  actor.  We  have  already  two  clear
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preconditions for populism: (1) the formation of an internal antagonistic frontier separating
the ‘people’  from power;  and (2)  an equivalential  articulation of  demands making the
emergence of the ‘people’ possible. There is a third precondition which does not really arise
until the political mobilization has reached a higher level: the unification of these various
demands – whose equivalence, up to that point, had not gone beyond a feeling of vague
solidarity – into a stable system of signification.”[5]
Now, the stability of a system of signification is always relative and precarious, and the
vagueness and indeterminacy of the notions involved is necessary, and indeed an essential
part of political dynamic, as Laclau describes it: “[V]agueness and indeterminacy are not
shortcomings of a discourse about social reality, but, in some circumstances, inscribed in
social reality as such”.[6] Neither individuals nor groups exist as self-contained entities that
enter into relations; rather, they become what they are by and through their relations. (This
is what Laclau means by ‘articulation’). To ascribe e.g. ‘interests’, ‘identities’, ‘values’ or
‘aims’ to individuals or groups is part and parcel of the process of signification through
which these individuals and groups come to be at all.
Such processes are altogether rhetorical. The words and imagery that shape the perception
and presentation of the parties, are part of the conflict, and shaped by the conflict. At the
incipient  level,  even  the  definition  of  the  situation  is  at  stake:  Are  we  dealing  with
disagreement within a given framework, or questioning the framework as such? In the first
case, we encounter contended issues, or problems, approachable one by one, in the second,
about conflict proper, where a number of different claims, taken together, come to signify
social division. A series of different demands become a “chain” when some of them becomes
placeholders for them all; this is how protesting groups become a movement.
An example from the history of the labour movement may be how the eight-hour working
day became a slogan and a rallying point: Immediately, it was about conditions of work, but
per  implication,  it  was also about  the conditions for  political  participation,  family  life,
culture etc. More generally, the heyday of labour movements has been when they were
genuinely populist – in the positive sense – that is, at times and places where “the working
class” and its organisations – unions and parties – was widely perceived as the legitimate
placeholder of “the people” – over against “the ruling classes”.
Of course, you cannot conjure up constellations like that. However, we may draw some
lessons.
(1) Popular discontent will sometimes inspire social movements; as political movements,
they will typically take populist form. Under given circumstances they may effect profound
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changes to society.
(2) Populist movements – i.e. broad, socio-political and cultural mobilizations in the name of
“the people” against “those in power” – are vital to democracy, past and present. Without
them, no processes of democratization in the past, and no productive confrontations on vital
issues now and in the future.
(3)  Political  movements  aiming  at  social  change  should  be  assessed  on  their  political
practice, i.e. what they aim at, and the means they employ. Bluntly put, the problem with
right-wing populists is their right-wing policies, not their populism per se.
(4) The programmes and practices of some populist movements are indeed threatening the
“agonistic pluralism” that is essential to democracy; however, this should not make us blind
to other threats, notably those associated with the discrediting of any populist agenda.
3. Populism (and democracy) as contested concepts
My title allude to the notion of “Essentially Contested Concepts”, which was introduced by
the British philosopher W B Gallie in a talk at The Aristotelian Society in London in 1956 –
quite far from current poststructuralist theories of “radical democracy”.[7] In my view,
however, it makes sense even in our context. His starting point is the observation that it is
much easier to come to terms about questions of, say, the size and materials of a painting,
than to agree on whether or not it should be regarded as a piece of art. That we do have
different and even conflicting interpretations of  it,  is,  according to Gallie,  an essential
feature of the concept of art itself.  Furthermore, the elaboration of such conflicts,  will
indeed further our understanding – both of the concept and of art. His other examples of
such essentially contested concepts include “christian doctrine”, “social justice” and, most
notably for our topic: “Democracy”.
One of the features that make a notion belong to the class of essentially contested concepts,
is that it denotes a complex phenomenon; one that may be described in different ways,
highlighting different aspects as the most important ones. However, Gallie insist that the
contestant conceptions is somehow perceived to refer to the same basic ideas – otherwise,
we are simply dealing with ambiguity or “essentially confused concepts”.  Furthermore,
these ideas seem to be “ideals” of sorts, or, as Gallie puts it, essentially contested concepts
are “appreciative”. Democracy is a contested concept because and as long as those who
disagree  over  the  interpretation  of  the  concept  and  of  what  institutions,  policies  and
practices deserve the name, at some level share the idea that democracy is something that
should be pursued.
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What then with “populism”? Maybe it  is  simply an essentially  confused concept.  Most
certainly, it is not an “appreciative” concept, given the fact that it is often used pejoratively,
denoting something negative, even dangerous. It is nevertheless, and this gets me to my
conclusion – albeit a preliminary one – a concept that is essential to the conception of
“Democracy”  that  I  endorse.  (Of  course,  I  recognize  that  competing  conceptions  of
democracy are possible.)
An essential feature of “democracy”, as I understand the concept, is that “the people” – the
“demos” – is the basis of legitimacy for institutions and policies. This, however, does not
imply that “democracy” has solved the problem of legitimacy. On the contrary, democracy
imply that questions of legitimacy in principle are kept open to public contestation. Of
course,  some degree  of  institutional  stability  is  generally  desirable  –  but  mainly  as  a
framework for productive conflict and disagreement. Sometimes decisions have to be made
and carried out, but legitimate policies should always be open to revision.
The  word  “democracy”  involves  a  reference  to  “the  people”.  Moreover,  the  idea  of
democratic  legitimacy  refer  to  “the  people”  –  and  thus  depend  on  the  symbolic
representation of “the people”, that is, on the words, images and social practices that shape
the presentation and perception of “the people” and the relation between “the people” and
“those  in  power”.  According  to  the  ideals  of  democracy,  those  in  power  should  be
representatives of the people. The reality of this is often questionable, however. Maybe we
should question it, even more often and more profoundly than the usual business of politics
allow. In times of crises,  when the legitimacy of institutions and policies are at stake,
profound conflicts over the symbolic representation of “the people” is bound to occur, in
some form or another: What is a people? Who are the people? Who can legitimately claim to
speak for the people? Whose claims, which attitudes and what commitments count – in fact
and in principle – when we quarrel, fight and try to make decisions about the common good?
The mirror-house where “populist rhetoric” confront “the rhetoric of populism” is not the
place  to  answer,  or  even pose  these  questions  –  because  neither  party  recognize  the
problem. On the one hand, we have those who purport to have the answer – to know the
identity of the people and of the enemy. On the other hand, we have those who dismiss the
question – and thereby dissolve the democratic people, insisting that we are all individuals,
that is, consumers and voters. In the realm of politics, voters are treated as consumers:
Competition  replace  productive  conflict  and  contestation.  Spin  and  branding  replace
movements and parties.
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